Evidence with Uncertain Likelihoods by Halpern, Joseph Y. & Pucella, Riccardo
ar
X
iv
:c
s/0
51
00
79
v2
  [
cs
.A
I] 
 3 
Au
g 2
00
6
Evidence with Uncertain Likelihoods
∗
Joseph Y. Halpern
Cornell University
Ithaca, NY 14853 USA
halpern@cs.cornell.edu
Riccardo Pucella
Northeastern University
Boston, MA 02115 USA
riccardo@ccs.neu.edu
Abstract
An agent often has a number of hypotheses, and must choose among them based
on observations, or outcomes of experiments. Each of these observations can be viewed
as providing evidence for or against various hypotheses. All the attempts to formalize
this intuition up to now have assumed that associated with each hypothesis h there is
a likelihood function µh, which is a probability measure that intuitively describes how
likely each observation is, conditional on h being the correct hypothesis. We consider
an extension of this framework where there is uncertainty as to which of a number
of likelihood functions is appropriate, and discuss how one formal approach to defining
evidence, which views evidence as a function from priors to posteriors, can be generalized
to accommodate this uncertainty.
1 Introduction
Consider an agent trying to choose among a number of hypotheses: Is it the case that all
ravens are black or not? Is a particular coin fair or double-headed? The standard picture
in such situations is that the agent makes a number of observations, which give varying
degrees of evidence for or against each of the hypotheses. The following simple example
illustrates the situation.
Example 1.1 Suppose that Alice and Bob each have a coin. Alice’s coin is double-headed,
Bob’s coin is fair. Charlie knows all of this. Alice and Bob give their coin to some third
party, Zoe, who chooses one of the coins, and tosses it. Charlie is not privy to Zoe’s choice,
but gets to see the outcome of the toss. Charlie is interested in two events (which are called
hypotheses in this context):
A: the coin is Alice’s coin
B: the coin is Bob’s coin.
∗A preliminary version of this paper appeared in the Proceedings of the 21st Conference on Uncertainty
in Artificial Intelligence, pp. 243–250, 2005. Most of this work was done while the second author was at
Cornell University.
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Now Charlie observes the coin land heads. What can he say about the probability of the
events A and B? If Charlie has no prior probability on A and B, then he can draw no
conclusions about their posterior probability; the probability of A could be any number in
[0, 1]. The same remains true if the coin lands heads 100 times in a row.
Clearly Charlie learns something from seeing 100 (or even one) coin toss land heads.
This has traditionally been modeled in terms of evidence: the more times Charlie sees
heads, the more evidence he has for the coin being double-headed. A number of ways of
have been proposed for modeling and quantifying evidence in the literature; see [Kyburg
1983] for an overview. We do not want to enter the debate here as to which approach is
best. Rather, we focus on a different problem regarding evidence, which seems not to have
been considered before.
All of the approaches to evidence considered in the literature make use of the likelihood
function. More precisely, they assume that for each hypothesis h of interest, there is a
probability µh (called a likelihood function) on the space of possible observations. In the
example above, if the coin is tossed once, the two possible observations are heads and tails .
Clearly µA(heads) = 1/2 and µB(heads) = 1. If the coin is tossed 100 times, then there
are 2100 possible observations (sequences of coin tosses). Again, µA and µB put obvious
probabilities on this space. In particular, if 100heads is the observation of seeing 100 heads
in a row, then µA(100heads ) = 1/2
100 and µB(100heads ) = 1. Most of the approaches
compute the relative weight of evidence of a particular observation ob for two hypotheses
A and B by comparing µA(ob) and µB(ob).
However, in many situations of interest in practice, the hypothesis h does not determine
a unique likehood function µh. To understand the issues that arise, consider the following
somewhat contrived variant of Example 1.1.
Example 1.2 Suppose that Alice has two coins, one that is double-headed and one that is
biased 3/4 towards heads, and chooses which one to give Zoe. Bob still has only one coin,
which is fair. Again, Zoe chooses either Alice’s coin or Bob’s coin and tosses it. Charlie,
who knows the whole setup, sees the coin land heads. What does this tell him about the
likelihood that the coin tossed was Alice’s?
The problem is that now we do not have a probability µA on observations corresponding
to the coin being Alice’s coin, since Charlie does not know if Alice’s coin is double-headed
or biased 3/4 towards heads. It seems that there is an obvious solution to this problem.
We simply split the hypothesis “the coin is Alice’s coin” into two hypotheses:
A1: the coin is Alice’s coin and it is double-headed
A2: the coin is Alice’s coin and it is the biased coin.
Now we can certainly apply standard techniques for computing evidence to the three hy-
potheses A1, A2, and B. The question now is what do the answers tell us about the evidence
in favor of the coin being Alice’s coin? More generally, how should we model and quantify
evidence when the likelihood functions themselves are uncertain?
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While Example 1.2 is admittedly contrived, situations like it arise frequently in practice.
For example, Epstein and Schneider [2005] show how multiple likelihoods can arise in invest-
ment decisions in the stock market, and the impact they can have on hedging strategies.1
For another example, consider a robot equipped with an unreliable sensor for navigation.
This sensor returns the distance to the wall in front of the robot, with some known error.
For simplicity, suppose that distances are measured in integral units 0, 1, 2, . . . , and that if
the wall is at distance m, then the sensor will return a reading of m−1 with probability 1/4,
a reading of m with probability 1/2, and a reading of m+1 with probability 1/4. Suppose
the robot wants to stop if it is exactly close to the wall, where “close” is interpreted as being
within 3 units of the wall, and go forward if it is farther than 3 units. So again, we have two
hypotheses of interest. However, while for each specific distance m we have a probability
µm on sensor readings, we do not have a probability on sensor readings corresponding to
the hypothesis far: “the robot is farther than 3 from the wall”. While standard techniques
will certainly give us the weight of evidence of a particular sensor reading for the hypothesis
“the robot is distance m from the wall”, it is not clear what the weight of evidence should
be for the hypothesis far.
We hope that these examples have convinced the reader that there is often likely to be
uncertainty about likelihoods. Moreover, as we show by considering one particular definition
of evidence, there are subtleties involved in defining evidence when there is uncertainty
about likelihoods. Although we focus on only one way of defining evidence, we believe
that these subtleties will arise no matter how evidence is represented, and that our general
approach to dealing with the problem can be applied to other approaches (although we have
not checked the details).
The approach for determining the weight of evidence that we consider in this paper is
due to Shafer [1982], and is a generalization of a method advocated by Good [1950]. The
idea is to assign to every observation and hypothesis a number between 0 and 1—the weight
of evidence for the hypothesis provided by the observation—that represents how much the
observation supports the hypothesis. The closer a weight is to 1, the more the observation
supports the hypothesis. This weight of evidence is computed using the likelihood functions
described earlier. This way of computing the weight of evidence has several good properties,
and is related to Shafer’s theory of belief functions [Shafer 1976]; for instance, the theory
gives a way to combine the weight of evidence from independent observations. We give
full details in Section 2. For now, we illustrate how the problems described above manifest
themselves in Shafer’s setting.
Let an evidence space E consist of a setH of possible hypotheses, a set O of observations,
and a probability µh on observations for each h ∈ H. We take the weight of evidence for
hypothesis h provided by observation ob in evidence space E , denoted wE(ob, h), to be
wE(ob, h) =
µh(ob)∑
h′∈H µh′(ob)
.
It is easy to see that wE (ob, ·) acts like a probability on H, in that
∑
h∈HwE (ob, h) = 1.
With this definition, it is easy to compute the weight of evidence for Alice’s coin when
1Epstein and Schneider present a general model of decision making in the presence of multiple likelihoods,
although they do not attempt to quantify the evidence provided by observations in the presence of multiple
likelihoods.
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Charlie sees heads in Example 1.1 is 2/3, and the weight of evidence when Charlie sees 100
heads is 2100/(2100+1). As expected, the more often Charlie sees heads, the more evidence
he has in favor of the coin being double-headed (provided that he does not see tails).
In Example 1.2, if we consider the three hypotheses A1, A2, and B, then the weight of
evidence for A1 when Charlie sees heads is 1/(1+ 3/4+1/2) = 4/9; similarly, the weight of
evidence for A2 is 1/3 and the weight of evidence for B is 2/9. Since weight of evidence acts
like a probability, it might then seem reasonable to take the weight of evidence for A (the
coin used was Alice’s coin) to be 4/9 + 1/3 = 7/9. (Indeed, this approach was implicitly
suggested in our earlier paper [Halpern and Pucella 2006].) But is this reasonable? A first
hint that it might not be is the observation that the weight of evidence for A is higher in
this case than it is in the case where Alice certainly had a double-headed coin.
To analyze this issue, we need an independent way of understanding what evidence is
telling us. As observed by Halpern and Fagin [1992], weight of evidence can be viewed as
a function from priors to posteriors. That is, given a prior on hypotheses, we can combine
the prior with the weight of evidence to get the posterior. In particular, if there are two
hypotheses, say H1 and H2, the weight of evidence for H1 is α, and the prior probability of
H1 is β, then the posterior probability of H1 (that is, the probability of H1 in light of the
evidence) is
αβ
αβ + (1− α)(1− β)
.
Thus, for example, by deciding to perform an action when the weight of evidence for A is
2/3 (i.e., after Charlie has seen the coin land heads once), Charlie is assured that, if the
prior probability of A is at least .01, then the posterior probability of A is at least 2/11;
similarly, after Charlie has seen 100 heads, if the prior probability of A is at least .01, then
the posterior probability of A is at least 2100/(2100 + 99).
But now consider the situation in Example 1.2. Again, suppose that the prior prob-
ability of A is at least .01. Can we conclude that the posterior probability of A is at
least .01(7/9)/(.01(7/9) + .99(2/9)) = 7/205? As we show, we cannot. The calculation
(αβ)/(αβ + (1 − α)(1 − β)) is appropriate only when there are two hypotheses. If the
hypotheses A1 and A2 have priors α1 and α2 and weights of evidence β1 and β2, then the
posterior probability of A is
α1β1 + α2β2
α1β1 + α2β2 + (1− α1 − α2)(1 − β1 − β2)
,
which is in general quite different from
(α1 + α2)(β1 + β2)
(α1 + α2)(β1 + β2) + (1− α1 − α2)(1− β1 − β2)
.
Moreover, it is easy to show that if β1 > β2 (as is the case here), then the posterior of A is
somewhere in the interval[
α2β2
α2β2 + (1− α2)(1 − β2)
,
α1β1
α1β1 + (1− α1)(1− β1)
]
.
That is, we get a lower bound on the posterior by acting as if the only possible hypotheses
are A2 and B, and we get an upper bound by acting as if the only possible hypotheses are
A1 and B.
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In this paper, we generalize this observation by providing a general approach to dealing
with weight of evidence when the likelihood function is unknown. In the special case when
the likelihood function is known, our approach reduces to Shafer’s approach. Roughly
speaking, the idea is to consider all possible evidence spaces consistent with the information.
The intuition is that one of them is the right one, but the agent trying to ascribe a weight
of evidence does not know which. For example, in Example 1.2, the evidence space either
involves hypotheses {A1, B} or hypotheses {A2, B}: either Alice’s first coin is used or Alice’s
second coin is used. We can then compute the weight of evidence for Alice’s coin being used
with respect to each evidence space. This gives us a range of possible weights of evidence,
which can be used for decision making in a way that seems most appropriate for the problem
at hand (by considering the max, the min, or some other function of the range).
The advantage of this approach is that it allows us to consider cases where there are
correlations between the likelihood functions. For example, suppose that, in the robot
example, the robot’s sensor was manufactured at one of two factories. The sensors at
factory 1 are more reliable than those of factory 2. Since the same sensor is used for all
readings, the appropriate evidence space either uses all likelihood functions corresponding
to factory 1 sensors, or all likelihood functions corresponding to factory 2 sensors.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review Shafer’s approach
to dealing with evidence. In Section 3, we show how to extend it so as to deal with situation
where the likelihood function is uncertain, and argue that our approach is reasonable. In
Section 4, we consider how to combine evidence in this setting. We conclude in Section 5.
The proofs of our technical results are deferred to the appendix.
2 Evidence: A Review
We briefly review the notion of evidence and its formalization by Shafer [1982], using some
terminology from [Halpern and Pucella 2005].
We start with a finite set H of hypotheses, which we take to be mutually exclusive and
exhaustive; thus, exactly one hypothesis holds at any given time. We also have a set O
of observations, which can be understood as outcomes of experiments that can be made.
Finally, we assume that for each hypothesis h ∈ H, there is a probability µh (often called
a likelihood function) on the observations in O. This is formalized as an evidence space
E = (H,O,µ), where H and O are as above, and µ is a likelihood mapping, which assigns
to every hypothesis h ∈ H a probability measure µ(h) = µh. (For simplicity, we often write
µh for µ(h), when the former is clear from context.)
For an evidence space E , the weight of evidence for hypothesis h ∈ H provided by
observation ob, written wE(ob, h), is
wE(ob, h) =
µh(ob)∑
h′∈H µh′(ob)
. (1)
The weight of evidence wE provided by an observation ob with
∑
h∈H µh(ob) = 0 is left
undefined by (1). Intuitively, this means that the observation ob is impossible. In the
literature on evidence it is typically assumed that this case never arises. More precisely, it
is assumed that all observations are possible, so that for every observation ob, there is an
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hypothesis h such that µh(ob) > 0. For simplicity, we make the same assumption here. (We
remark that in some application domains this assumption holds because of the structure of
the domain, without needing to be assumed explicitly; see [Halpern and Pucella 2005] for
an example.)
The measure wE always lies between 0 and 1, with 1 indicating that the observation
provides full evidence for the hypothesis. Moreover, for each fixed observation ob for which∑
h∈H µh(ob) > 0,
∑
h∈HwE(ob, h) = 1, and thus the weight of evidence wE looks like a
probability measure for each ob. While this has some useful technical consequences, one
should not interpret wE as a probability measure. It is simply a way to assign a weight to
hypotheses given observations, and, as we shall soon see, can be seen as a way to update a
prior probability on the hypotheses into a posterior probability on those hypotheses, based
on the observations made.
Example 2.1 In Example 1.1, the set H of hypotheses is {A,B}; the set O of observations
is simply {heads , tails}, the possible outcomes of a coin toss. From the discussion following
the description of the example, it follows that µ assigns the following likelihood functions
to the hypotheses: since µA(heads) is the probability that the coin landed heads if it is
Alice’s coin (i.e., if it is double-headed), then µA(heads) = 1 and µA(tails) = 0. Similarly,
µB(heads) is the probability that the coin lands heads if it is fair, so µB(heads) = 1/2 and
µB(tails) = 1/2. This can be summarized by the following table:
µ A B
heads 1 1/2
tails 0 1/2
Let
E = ({A,B}, {heads , tails},µ).
A straightforward computation shows that wE(heads , A) = 2/3 and wE(heads , B) = 1/3.
Intuitively, the coin landing heads provides more evidence for the hypothesis A than the
hypothesis B. Similarly, w(tails , A) = 0 and w(tails , A) = 1. Thus, the coin landing tail
indicates that the coin must be fair. This information can be represented by the following
table:
wE A B
heads 2/3 1/3
tails 0 1
It is possible to interpret the weight function w as a prescription for how to update a
prior probability on the hypotheses into a posterior probability on those hypotheses, after
having considered the observations made [Halpern and Fagin 1992]. There is a precise sense
in which wE can be viewed as a function that maps a prior probability µ0 on the hypotheses
H to a posterior probability µob based on observing ob, by applying Dempster’s Rule of
Combination [Shafer 1976]. That is,
µob = µ0 ⊕wE (ob, ·), (2)
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where ⊕ combines two probability distributions on H to get a new probability distribution
on H as follows:
(µ1 ⊕ µ2)(H) =
∑
h∈H µ1(h)µ2(h)∑
h∈H µ1(h)µ2(h)
. (3)
(Strictly speaking, ⊕ is defined for set functions, that is, functions with domain 2H. We
have defined wE(ob, ·) as a function with domain H, but is is clear from (3) that this is all
that is really necessary to compute µ0⊕wE (ob, ·) in our case.) Note that (3) is not defined
if
∑
h∈H µ1(h)µ2(h) = 0—this means that the update (2) is not defined when the weight
of evidence provided by observation ob all goes for an hypothesis h with prior probability
µ0(h) = 0
Bayes’ Rule is the standard way of updating a prior probability based on an observation,
but it is only applicable when we have a joint probability distribution on both the hypotheses
and the observations, something which we did not assume we had. Dempster’s Rule of
Combination essentially “simulates” the effects of Bayes’s rule. The relationship between
Dempster’s Rule and Bayes’ Rule is made precise by the following well-known theorem.
Proposition 2.2 [Halpern and Fagin 1992] Let E = (H,O,µ) be an evidence space. Sup-
pose that P is a probability on H×O such that P (H×{ob}|{h}×O) = µh(ob) for all h ∈ H
and all ob ∈ O. Let µ0 be the probability on H induced by marginalizing P ; that is, µ0(h) =
P ({h} × O). For ob ∈ O, let µob = µ0 ⊕ wE (ob, ·). Then µob(h) = P ({h} × O|H × {ob}).
In other words, when we do have a joint probability on the hypotheses and observations, then
Dempster’s Rule of Combination gives us the same result as a straightforward application
of Bayes’ Rule.
3 Evidence with Uncertain Likelihoods
In Example 1.1, each of the two hypotheses A and B determines a likelihood function.
However, in Example 1.2, the hypothesis A does not determine a likelihood function. By
viewing it as the compound hypothesis {A1, A2}, as we did in the introduction, we can
construct an evidence space with a set {A1, A2, B} of hypotheses. We then get the following
likelihood mapping µ:
µ A1 A2 B
heads 1 3/4 1/2
tails 0 1/4 1/2
Taking
E = ({A1, A2, B}, {heads , tails},µ),
we can compute the following weights of evidence:
wE A1 A2 B
heads 4/9 1/3 2/9
tails 0 1/3 2/3
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If we are now given prior probabilities for A1, A2, and B, we can easily use Propo-
sition 2.2 to compute posterior probabilities for each of these events, and then add the
posterior probabilities of A1 and A2 to get a posterior probability for A.
But what if we are given only a prior probability µ0 for A and B, and are not given
probabilities for A1 and A2? As observed in the introduction, if we define wE(heads , A) =
wE(heads , A1) +wE (heads , A2) = 7/9, and then try to compute the posterior probability of
A given that heads is observed by naively applying the equation in Proposition 2.2, that is,
taking by µheads (A) = (µ0⊕wE(heads , ·))(A), we get an inappropriate answer. In particular,
the answer is not the posterior probability in general.
To make this concrete, suppose that µ0(A) = .01. Then, as observed in the introduction,
a naive application of this equation suggests that the posterior probability of A is 7/205.
But suppose that in fact µ0(A1) = α for some α ∈ [0, .01]. Then applying Proposition 2.2,
we see that µheads (A1) = α(4/9)/(α(4/9) + (.01−α)(1/3) + .99(2/9) = 4α/(α+ 2.01). It is
easy to check that 4α/(α+2.01) = 7/205 iff α = 1407/81300. That is, the naive application
of the equation in Proposition 2.2 is correct only if we assume a particular (not terribly
reasonable) value for the prior probability of A1.
We now present one approach to dealing with the problem, and argue that it is reason-
able.
Define a generalized evidence space to be a tuple G = (H,O,∆), where ∆ is a finite set
of likelihood mappings. As we did in Section 2, we assume that every µ ∈ ∆ makes every
observation possible: for all µ ∈ ∆ and all observations ob, there is an hypothesis h such
that µ(h)(ob) > 0. Note for future reference that we can associate with the generalized
evidence space G = (H,O,∆) the set S(G) = {(H,O,µ) | µ ∈ ∆} of evidence spaces. Thus,
given a generalized evidence space G, we can define the generalized weight of evidence wG
to be the set {wE : E ∈ S(G)} of weights of evidence. We often treat wG as a set-valued
function, writing wG(ob, h) for {w(ob, h) | w ∈ wG}.
Just as we can combine a prior with the weight of evidence to get a posterior in a
standard evidence spaces, given a generalized evidence space, we can combine a prior with
a generalized weight of evidence to get a set of posteriors. Given a prior probability µ0
on a set H of hypotheses and a generalized weight of evidence wG , let Pµ0,ob be the set of
posterior probabilities on H corresponding to an observation ob and prior µ0, computed
according to Proposition 2.2:
Pµ0,ob = {µ0 ⊕w(ob, ·) | w ∈ wG , µ⊕ w(ob, ·) defined}. (4)
Since µ0⊕w(ob, ·) need not always exist for a given w ∈ wG , the set Pµ0,ob is made up only
of those µ0 ⊕ w(ob, ·) that do exist.
Example 3.1 The generalized evidence space for Example 1.2, where Alice’s coin is un-
known, is
G = ({A,B}, {heads , tails}, {µ1,µ2}),
where µ1(A) = µA1 , µ2(A) = µA2 , and µ1(B) = µ2(B) = µB. Thus, the first likelihood
mapping corresponds to Alice’s coin being double-headed, and the second corresponds to
Alice’s coin being biased 3/4 towards heads. Then wG = {w1, w2}, where w1(heads , A) =
2/3 and w2(heads , A) = 3/5. Thus, if µ0(A) = α, then Pµ0,heads (A) = {
3α
α+2 ,
2α
α+1}.
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We have now given two approaches for capturing the situation in Example 1.2. The
first involves refining the set of hypotheses —that is, replacing the hypothesis A by A1 and
A2—and using a standard evidence space. The second involves using a generalized evidence
space. How do they compare?
To make this precise, we need to first define what a refinement is. We say that the
evidence space (H′,O,µ′) refines, or is a refinement of, the generalized evidence space
(H,O,∆) via g if g : H′ → H is a surjection such that µ ∈ ∆ if and only if, for all h ∈ H,
there exists some h′ ∈ g−1(h) such that µ(h) = µ′(h′). For example, the evidence space
E at the beginning of this section (corresponding to Example 1.2) is a refinement of the
generalized evidence space G in Example 3.1 via the surjection g : {A1, A2, B} → {A,B}
that maps A1 and A2 to A and B to B.
It is almost immediate from the definition of refinement that (H′,O,µ′) refines (H,O,∆)
only if ∆ has a particularly simple structure.
Proposition 3.2 If (H′,O,µ′) refines (H,O,∆) via g, then ∆ =
∏
h∈H Ph, where Ph =
{µ′(h′) | h′ ∈ g−1(h)}.
Intuitively, each hypothesis h ∈ H is refined to the set of hypotheses g−1(h) ⊆ H′; moreover,
each likelihood function µ(h) in a likelihood mapping µ ∈ ∆ is the likelihood function µ′(h′)
for some hypothesis h′ refining h.
A prior µ′0 on H
′ extends a prior µ0 on H if for all h,
µ′0(g
−1(h)) = µ0(h).
Let Ext(µ0) consist of all priors on H
′ that extend µ0. Recall that, given a set P of
probability measures, the lower probability P∗(U) of a set U is inf{µ(U) | µ ∈ P} and its
upper probability P∗(U) is sup{µ(U) | µ ∈ P} [Halpern 2003].
Proposition 3.3 Let E = (H′,O,µ′) be a refinement of the generalized evidence space
G = (H,O,∆) via g. For all ob ∈ O and all h ∈ H, we have
(Pµ0,ob)
∗(h) = {µ′0 ⊕ wE(ob, ·) | µ
′
0 ∈ Ext(µ0)}
∗(g−1(h))
and
(Pµ0,ob)∗(h) = {µ
′
0 ⊕ wE(ob, ·) | µ
′
0 ∈ Ext(µ0)}∗(g
−1(h)).
In other words, if we consider the sets of posteriors obtained by either (1) updating
a prior probability µ0 by the generalized weight of evidence of an observation in G or (2)
updating the set of priors extending µ0 by the weight of evidence of the same observation
in E , the bounds on those two sets are the same. Therefore, this proposition shows that,
given a generalized evidence space G, if there an evidence space E that refines it, then the
weight of evidence wG gives us essentially the same information as wE . But is there always
an evidence space E that refines a generalized evidence space? That is, can we always
understand a generalized weight of evidence in terms of a refinement? As we now show, we
cannot always do this.
Let G be a generalized evidence space (H,O,∆). Note that if E refines G then, roughly
speaking, the likelihood mappings in ∆ consist of all possible ways of combining the likeli-
hood functions corresponding to the hypotheses in H. We now formalize this property. A
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set ∆ of likelihood mappings is uncorrelated if there exist sets of probability measures Ph
for each h ∈ H such that
∆ =
∏
h∈H
Ph = {µ | µ(h) ∈ Ph for all h ∈ H}.
(We say ∆ is correlated if it is not uncorrelated.) A generalized evidence space (H,O,∆)
is uncorrelated if ∆ is uncorrelated.
Observe that if (H′,O,µ′) refines (H,O,∆) via g, then (H,O,∆) is uncorrelated since,
by Proposition 3.2, ∆ =
∏
h∈H Ph, where Ph = {µ
′(h′) | h′ ∈ g−1(h)}. Not only is
every refinement uncorrelated, but every uncorrelated evidence space can be viewed as a
refinement.
Proposition 3.4 Let G be a generalized evidence space. There exists an evidence space E
that refines G if and only if G is uncorrelated.
Thus, if a situation can be modeled using an uncorrelated generalized evidence space, then
it can also be modeled by refining the set of hypotheses and using a simple evidence space.
The uncorrelated case has a further advantage. It leads to simple formula for calculating
the posterior in the special case that there are only two hypotheses (which is the case that
has been considered most often in the literature, often to the exclusion of other cases).
Given a generalized evidence space G = (H,O,∆) and the corresponding generalized
weight of evidence wG , we can define upper and lower weights of evidence, determined by
the maximum and minimum values in the range, somewhat analogous to the notions of
upper and lower probability. Define the upper weight of evidence function wG by taking
wG(ob, h) = sup{w(ob , h) | w ∈ wG}.
Similarly, define the lower weight of evidence function wG by taking
wG(ob, h) = inf{w(ob, h) | w ∈ wG}.
These upper and lower weights of evidence can be used to compute the bounds on the
posteriors obtained by updating a prior probability via the generalized weight of evidence
of an observation, in the case where G is uncorrelated, and when there are two hypotheses.
Proposition 3.5 Let G = (H,O,∆) be an uncorrelated generalized evidence space.
(a) The following inequalities hold when the denominators are nonzero:
(Pµ0,ob)
∗(h) ≤
wG(ob, h)µ0(h)
wG(ob, h)µ0(h) +
∑
h′ 6=h
wG(ob, h
′)µ0(h′)
; (5)
(Pµ0,ob)∗(h) ≥
wG(ob, h)µ0(h)
wG(ob, h)µ0(h) +
∑
h′ 6=h
wG(ob, h′)µ0(h′)
. (6)
If |H| = 2, these inequalities can be taken to be equalities.
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(b) The following equalities hold:
wG(ob, h) =
(Ph)
∗(ob)
(Ph)∗(ob) +
∑
h′ 6=h
(Ph′)∗(ob)
;
wG(ob, h) =
(Ph)∗(ob)
(Ph)∗(ob) +
∑
h′ 6=h
(Ph′)∗(ob)
,
where Ph = {µ(h) | µ ∈ ∆}, for all h ∈ H.
Thus, if have an uncorrelated generalized evidence space with two hypotheses, we can
compute the bounds on the posteriors Pµ0,ob in terms of upper and lower weights of evidence
using Proposition 3.5(a), which consists of equalities in that case. Moreover, we can compute
the upper and lower weights of evidence using Proposition 3.5(b). As we now show, the
inequalities in Proposition 3.5(a) can be strict if there are more than two hypotheses.
Example 3.6 Let H = {D,E,F} and O = {X,Y }, and consider the two probability
measures µ1 and µ2, where µ1(X) = 1/3 and µ2(X) = 2/3. Let G = (H,O,∆), where
∆ = {µ | µ(h) ∈ {µ1, µ2}}. Clearly, ∆ is uncorrelated. Let µ0 be the uniform prior on H,
so that µ0(D) = µ0(E) = µ0(F ) = 1/3. Using Proposition 3.5(b), we can compute that the
upper and lower weights of evidence are as given in the following tables:
wG D E F
X 1/2 1/2 1/2
Y 1/2 1/2 1/2
wG D E F
X 1/5 1/5 1/5
Y 1/5 1/5 1/5
The uniform measure is the identity for ⊕, and therefore µ0⊕w(ob, ·) = w(ob, ·). It follows
that Pµ0,X = {w(X, ·) | w ∈ wG}. Hence, (Pµ0,X)
∗(D) = 1/2 and (Pµ0,X)∗(D) = 1/5.
But the right-hand sides of (5) and (6) are 5/9 and 1/6, respectively, and similarly for
hypotheses E and F . Thus, in this case, the inequalities in Proposition 3.5(a) are strict.
While uncorrelated generalized evidence spaces are certainly of interest, correlated
spaces arise in natural settings. To see this, first consider the following somewhat con-
trived example.
Example 3.7 Consider the following variant of Example 1.2. Alice has two coins, one that
is double-headed and one that is biased 3/4 towards heads, and chooses which one to give
Zoe. Bob also has two coins, one that is fair and one that is biased 2/3 towards tails, and
chooses which one to give Zoe. Zoe chooses one of the two coins she was given and tosses
it. The hypotheses are {A,B} and the observations are {heads , tails}, as in Example 1.2.
The likelihood function µ1 for Alice’s double-headed coin is given by µ1(heads) = 1, while
the likelihood function µ2 for Alice’s biased coin is given by µ2(heads) = 3/4. Similarly, the
likelihood function µ3 for Bob’s fair coin is given by µ3(heads) = 1/2, and the likelihood
function µ4 for Bob’s biased coin is given by µ4(heads) = 1/3.
If Alice and Bob each make their choice of which coin to give Zoe independently, we can
use the following generalized evidence space to model the situation:
G1 = ({A,B}, {heads , tails},∆1),
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where
∆1 = {(µ1, µ3), (µ1, µ4), (µ2, µ3), (µ2, µ4)}.
Clearly, ∆1 is uncorrelated, since it is equal to {µ1, µ2} × {µ3, µ4}.
On the other hand, suppose that Alice and Bob agree beforehand that either Alice gives
Zoe her double-headed coin and Bob gives Zoe his fair coin, or Alice gives Zoe her biased
coin and Bob gives Zoe his biased coin. This situation can be modeled using the following
generalized evidence space:
G2 = ({A,B}, {heads , tails},∆2),
where
∆2 = {(µ1, µ3), (µ2, µ4)}.
Here, note that ∆2 is a correlated set of likelihood mappings.
While this example is artificial, the example in the introduction, where the robot’s
sensors could have come from either factory 1 or factory 2, is a perhaps more realistic case
where correlated evidence spaces arise. The key point here is that these examples show that
we need to go beyond just refining hypotheses to capture a situation.
4 Combining Evidence
An important property of Shafer’s [1982] representation of evidence is that it is possible to
combine the weight of evidence of independent observations to obtain the weight of evidence
of a sequence of observations. The purpose of this section is to show that our framework
enjoys a similar property, but, rather unsurprisingly, new subtleties arise due to the presence
of uncertainty. For simplicity, in this section we concentrate exclusively on combining the
evidence of a sequence of two observations; the general case follows in a straightforward
way.
Recall how combining evidence is handled in Shafer’s approach. Let E = (H,O,µ) be
an evidence space. We define the likelihood functions µh on pairs of observations, by taking
µh(〈ob1, ob2〉) = µh(ob1)µh(ob2). In other words, the probability of observing a particular
sequence of observations given h is the product of the probability of making each observation
in the sequence. Thus, we are implicitly assuming that the observations are independent.
It is well known (see, for example, [Halpern and Fagin 1992, Theorem 4.3]) that Dempster’s
Rule of Combination can be used to combine evidence; that is,
wE(〈ob1, ob2〉, ·) = wE(ob1, ·)⊕ wE(ob2, ·).
If we let µ0 be a prior probability on the hypotheses, and µ〈ob1,ob2〉 be the probability on
the hypotheses after observing ob1 and ob2, we can verify that
µ〈ob1,ob2〉 = µ0 ⊕wE (〈ob1, ob2〉, ·).
Here we are assuming that exactly one hypothesis holds, and it holds each time we make an
observation. That is, if Zoe picks the double-headed coin, she uses it for both coin tosses.
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Example 4.1 Recall Example 2.1, where Alice just has a double-headed coin and Bob just
has a fair coin. Suppose that Zoe, after being given the coins and choosing one of them,
tosses it twice, and it lands heads both times. It is straightforward to compute that
wE A B
〈heads , heads〉 4/5 1/5
〈heads , tails〉 0 1
〈tails , heads〉 0 1
〈tails , tails〉 0 1
Not surprisingly, if either of the observations is tails , the coin cannot be Alice’s. In the
case where the observations are 〈heads , heads〉, the evidence for the coin being Alice’s (that
is, double-headed) is greater than if a single heads is observed, since from Example 2.1,
wE(heads , A) = 2/3. This agrees with our intuition that seeing two heads in a row provides
more evidence for a coin to be double-headed than if a single heads is observed.
How should we combine evidence for a sequence of observations when we have a gener-
alized evidence space? That depends on how we interpret the assumption that the “same”
hypothesis holds for each observation. In a generalized evidence space, we have possibly
many likelihood functions for each hypothesis. The real issue is whether we use the same
likelihood function each time we evaluate an observation, or whether we can use a different
likelihood function associated with that hypothesis. The following examples show that this
distinction can be critical.
Example 4.2 Consider Example 1.2 again, where Alice has two coins (one double-headed,
one biased toward heads), and Bob has a fair coin. Alice chooses a coin and gives it to
Zoe; Bob gives his coin to Zoe. As we observed, there are two likelihood mappings in this
case, giving rise to the weights of evidence we called w1 and w2; w1 corresponds to Alice’s
coin being double-headed, and w2 corresponds to the coin being biased 3/4 towards heads.
Suppose that Zoe tosses the coin twice. Since she is tossing the same coin, it seems most
appropriate to consider the generalized weight of evidence
{w′ | w′(〈ob1, ob2〉, ·) = wi(ob1, ·)⊕ wi(ob2, ·), i ∈ {1, 2}}.
On the other hand, suppose Zoe first chooses whether she will always use Alice’s or
Bob’s coin. If she chooses Bob, then she obviously uses his coin for both tosses. If she
chooses Alice, before each toss, she asks Alice for a coin and tosses it; however, she does not
have to use the same coin of Alice’s for each toss. Now the likelihood function associated
with each observation can change. Thus, the appropriate generalized weight of evidence is
{w′ | w′(〈ob1, ob2〉, ·) = wi(ob1, ·)⊕ wj(ob2, ·), i, j ∈ {1, 2}}.
Fundamentally, combining evidence in generalized evidence spaces relies on Dempster’s
rule of combination, just like in Shafer’s approach. However, as Example 4.2 shows, the
exact details depends on our understanding of the experiment. While the first approach
used in Example 4.2 seems more appropriate in most cases that we could think of, we suspect
that there will be cases where something like the second approach may be appropriate.
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5 Conclusion
In the literature on evidence, it is generally assumed that there is a single likelihood function
associated with each hypothesis. There are natural examples, however, which violate this
assumption. While it may appear that a simple step of refining the set of hypotheses allows
us to use standard techniques, we have shown that this approach can lead to counterintu-
itive results when evidence is used as a basis for making decisions. To solve this problem,
we proposed a generalization of a popular approach to representing evidence. This gen-
eralization behaves correctly under updating, and gives the same bounds on the posterior
probability as that obtained by refining the set of hypotheses when there is no correlation
between the various likelihood functions for the hypotheses. As we show, this is the one
situation where we can identify a generalized evidence space with the space obtained by
refining the hypotheses. One advantage of our approach is that we can also reason about
situations where the likelihood functions are correlated, something that cannot be done by
refining the set of hypotheses.
We have also looked at how to combine evidence in a generalized evidence space. While
the basic ideas from standard evidence spaces carry over, that is, the combination is essen-
tially obtained using Dempster’s rule of combination, the exact details of how this combina-
tion should be performed depend on the specifics of how the likelihood functions change for
each observation. A more detailed dynamic model would be helpful in understanding the
combination of evidence in a generalized evidence space setting; we leave this exploration
for future work.
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A Proofs
We first establish some results that are useful for proving Proposition 3.3. The following
lemma gives an alternate way of updating a prior probability by a weight of evidence.
Lemma A.1 Let E = (H,O,µ) be an evidence space. For all ob and H ⊆ H,
(µ0 ⊕ wE(ob, ·))(H) =
∑
h∈H µ0(h)µ(h)(ob)∑
h∈H µ0(h)µ(h)(ob)
.
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Proof. By the definition of ⊕ and wE ,
(µ0 ⊕ wE(ob, ·))(H) =
∑
h∈H µ0(h)wE (ob, h)∑
h∈H µ0(h)wE (ob, h)
=
∑
h∈H µ0(h)
µ(h)(ob)∑
h∈Hµ(h)(ob)∑
h∈H µ0(h)
µ(h)(ob)∑
h∈H µ(h)(ob)
=
∑
h∈H µ0(h)µ(h)(ob)∑
h∈H µ0(h)µ(h)(ob)
.
Some notation will simplify the presentation of the other results. Suppose that E =
(H′,O,µ′) is a refinement of G = (H,O,∆) via g. Given a prior probability µ0 on H,
recall that Ext(µ0) consists of all priors on H
′ that extend µ0. Let Ext
A(µ0) be the subset
of Ext(µ0) consisting of all priors µ
′ on H such that, for all h ∈ H, there exists some
h′ ∈ g−1(h) such that µ′0(h
′) = µ0(h). In other words, the probability measures in Ext
A(µ0)
place all the probability µ0(g
−1(h)) onto a single hypothesis in g−1(h). If µ ∈ ∆, let Eµ be
the evidence space (H,O,µ).
Lemma A.2 Let µ0 be a prior probability on H.
(a) For every µ ∈ ∆, there is a µ′0 ∈ Ext
A(µ0) such that, for all h ∈ H and ob ∈ O,
(µ0 ⊕ wEµ (ob, ·))(h) = (µ
′
0 ⊕ wE(ob, ·))(g
−1(h)).
(b) For every µ′0 ∈ Ext
A(µ0), there is a µ ∈ ∆ such that, for all h ∈ H and ob ∈ O,
(µ0 ⊕ wEµ (ob, ·))(h) = (µ
′
0 ⊕ wE(ob, ·))(g
−1(h)).
Proof. Let µ0 be a prior probability on H. To prove (a), let µ be a likelihood mapping in ∆.
By the definition of refinement, there is a function fµ : H → H
′ such that fµ(h) ∈ g
−1(h)
and µ(h) = µ′(fµ(h)). (Of course, there can be more than one such function.) Define µ
′
0
by taking µ′0(h
′) = µ0(h) if h
′ = fµ(h) for some h, and µ
′
0(h
′) = 0 otherwise. Clearly,
µ′0 ∈ Ext
A(µ0), and
(µ0 ⊕ wEµ (ob, ·))(h) =
µ0(h)µ(h)(ob)∑
h∈H µ0(h)µ(h)(ob)
[by Lemma A.1]
=
µ′0(fbmu(h))µ
′(fµ(h))(ob)∑
h∈H µ
′
0(fµ(h))µ
′(fµ (h))(ob)
[by definition of µ′0 and fµ]
=
∑
h′∈g−1(h) µ
′
0(h
′)µ′(h′)(ob)∑
h
′
∈H′
µ′0(h
′
)µ′(h
′
)(ob)
[adding zero terms]
= (µ′0 ⊕ wE(ob, ·))(g
−1(h)).
The proof of (b) is analogous. Let µ′0 be a prior probability in Ext
A(µ0). Define
fµ′0 : H → H
′ so that for all h ∈ H, fµ′0(h) is the unique h
′ ∈ g−1(h) such that µ0(h) =
µ′0(h
′). Again, by the definition of refinement, this means there is a µ ∈ ∆ such that
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µ(h) = µ′(fµ′0(h)). A straightforward computation shows that
(µ0 ⊕ wEµ (ob, ·))(h) =
µ0(h)µ(h)(ob)∑
h∈H µ0(h)µ(h)(ob)
[by Lemma A.1]
=
µ′0(fµ′0
(h))µ′(fµ′0
(h))(ob)∑
h∈H µ
′
0(fµ′
0
(h))µ′(fµ′
0
(h))(ob)
[by definition of µ′0 and fµ′0 ]
=
∑
h′∈g−1(h) µ
′
0(h
′)µ′(h′)(ob)∑
h
′
∈H′
µ′0(h
′
)µ′(h
′
)(ob)
[adding zero terms]
= (µ′0 ⊕ wE(ob, ·))(g
−1(h)).
Proposition 3.2 If (H′,O,µ′) refines (H,O,∆) via g, then ∆ =
∏
h∈H Ph, where Ph =
{µ′(h′) | h′ ∈ g−1(h)}.
Proof. Suppose that (H′,O,µ′) refines (H,O,∆) via g. For h ∈ H, let Ph = {µ
′(h′) | h′ ∈
g−1(h)}. We show that ∆ =
∏
h∈H Ph. By the definition of refinement, µ ∈ ∆ if and only
if, for all h ∈ H, there there exists some h′ ∈ g−1(h) such that µ(h) = µ′(h′), which is the
case if and only if, for all h ∈ H, µ(h) ∈ Ph, that is, µ ∈
∏
h∈H Ph. Thus, ∆ =
∏
h∈H Ph.
Proposition 3.3 Let E = (H′,O,µ′) be a refinement of the generalized evidence space
G = (H,O,∆) via g. For all ob ∈ O and all h ∈ H, we have
(Pµ0,ob)
∗(h) = {µ′0 ⊕ wE(ob, ·) | µ
′
0 ∈ Ext(µ0)}
∗(g−1(h))
and
(Pµ0,ob)∗(h) = {µ
′
0 ⊕ wE(ob, ·) | µ
′
0 ∈ Ext(µ0)}∗(g
−1(h)).
Proof. We prove the first equality; the second follows by a similar argument. First, we
prove that (Pµ0,ob)
∗(h) ≤ {µ′0 ⊕ wE(ob, ·) | µ
′
0 ∈ Ext(µ0)}
∗(g−1(h)). This follows almost
immediately from Lemma A.2, which says that for all w ∈ wG , there is a measure µ
′
0 ∈
ExtA(µ0) ⊆ Ext(µ0) such that
(µ0 ⊕ w(ob, ·))(h) = (µ
′
0 ⊕ wE (ob, ·))(g
−1(h))
≤ {µ′0 ⊕wE (ob, ·) | µ
′
0 ∈ Ext(µ0)}
∗(g−1(h)).
Since w ∈ wG was chosen arbitrarily, by the properties of sup, we have
(Pµ0,ob)
∗(h) = sup{(µ0 ⊕w(ob, ·))(h) | w ∈ wG}
≤ {µ′0 ⊕ wE(ob, ·) | µ
′
0 ∈ Ext(µ0)}
∗(g−1(h)),
as required.
To prove the reverse inequality, it suffices to show that for every ob and h, and for every
µ′0 ∈ Ext(µ0), there is a measure µ
′′
0 ∈ Ext
A(µ0) such that
(µ′0 ⊕ wE(ob, ·))(g
−1(h)) ≤ (µ′′0 ⊕ wE(ob, ·))(g
−1(h)). (7)
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To prove (7), we first define a function fµ′0 : H → H
′ such that fµ′0(h) is an hypothesis
in g−1(h) that maximizes µ′(h′′)(ob) over all h′′ ∈ g−1(h), and fµ′0(h) for h 6= h is an
hypothesis in g−1(h) that minimizes µ′(h′′)(ob) over all h′′ ∈ g−1(h).
Define µ′′0(h
′) as follows:
µ′′0(h
′) =
{
µ′0(g
−1(h)) if h′ = fµ′0(h) for some h
0 otherwise.
Clearly, µ′′0 is in Ext
A(µ0). We now show that (7) holds. There are two cases.
If
∑
h′∈g−1(h) µ
′
0(h
′)µ′(h′)(ob) = 0, then
(µ′0 ⊕ wE(ob, ·))(g
−1(h)) =
∑
h′∈g−1(h) µ
′
0(h
′)µ′(h′)(ob)∑
h′∈H′ µ
′
0(h
′)µ′(h′)(ob) [by Lemma A.1]
= 0
≤ (µ′′0 ⊕ wE(ob, ·))(g
−1(h)) [since µ′′0 ⊕ wE is a probability].
Thus, (7) holds in this case.
If
∑
h′∈g−1(h) µ
′
0(h
′)µ′(h′)(ob) > 0, then
(µ′0 ⊕ wE(ob, ·))(g
−1(h)) =
∑
h′∈g−1(h) µ
′
0(h
′)µ′(h′)(ob)∑
h′∈H′ µ
′
0(h
′)µ′(h′)(ob)
[by Lemma A.1]
= 1
1+
∑
h′∈H′−g−1(h)
µ′
0
(h′)µ′(h′)(ob)∑
h′∈g−1(h)
µ′0(h
′)µ′(h′)(ob)
= 1
1+
∑
h∈H−{h}
∑
h′∈g−1(h)
µ′
0
(h′)µ′(h′)(ob)∑
h′∈g−1(h)
µ′
0
(h′)µ′(h′)(ob)
≤ 1
1+
∑
h∈H−{h}
∑
h′∈g−1(h)
µ′
0
(h′)µ′(f
µ′0
(h))(ob)∑
h′∈g−1(h)
µ′
0
(h′)µ′(f
µ′0
(h))(ob)
[by definition of fµ′0 ]
= 1
1+
∑
h∈H−{h}
µ′(f
µ′0
(h))(ob)
∑
h′∈g−1(h)
µ′0(h
′)
µ′(f
µ′0
(h))(ob)
∑
h′∈g−1(h)
µ′
0
(h′)
= 1
1+
∑
h∈H−{h}
µ′(f
µ′
0
(h))(ob)
∑
h′∈g−1(h)
µ′′0 (h
′)
µ′(f
µ′
0
(h))(ob)
∑
h′∈g−1(h)
µ′′0 (h
′)
[by definition of µ′′0 ]
= 1
1+
∑
h∈H−{h}
∑
h′∈g−1(h)
µ′′
0
(h′)µ′(h′)(ob)∑
h′∈g−1(h)
µ′′0 (h
′)µ′(h′)(ob)
[since µ′′0(h
′) = 0 if h′ 6= fµ′0(h)]
= 1
1+
∑
h′∈H′−g−1(h)
µ′′
0
(h′)µ′(h′)(ob)∑
h′∈g−1(h)
µ′′0 (h
′)µ′(h′)(ob)
=
∑
h′∈g−1(h) µ
′′
0 (h
′)µ′(h′)(ob)∑
h′∈H′ µ
′′
0 (h
′)µ′(h′)(ob)
= (µ′′0 ⊕ wE(ob, ·))(g
−1(h)).
Therefore, (7) holds in this case as well.
Now by Lemma A.2, corresponding to this µ′′0 , there exists some µ ∈ ∆ such that
(µ0 ⊕ wEµ (ob, ·))(h) = (µ
′′
0 ⊕ wE(ob, ·))(g
−1(h)). Thus,
(µ′0 ⊕ wE (ob, ·))(g
−1(h)) ≤ (µ′′0 ⊕ wE(ob, ·))(g
−1(h))
= (µ0 ⊕ wEµ (ob, ·))(h)
≤ (Pµ0,ob)
∗(h).
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Since µ′0 was chosen arbitrarily, by the properties of sup, we have
{µ′0 ⊕wE (ob, ·) | µ
′
0 ∈ Ext(µ0)}
∗(g−1(h)) ≤ (Pµ0,ob)
∗(h),
as required.
Proposition 3.4 Let G be a generalized evidence space. There exists an evidence space E
that refines G if and only if G is uncorrelated.
Proof. The forward direction is exactly Proposition 3.2. For the converse, suppose that
G = (H,O,∆) is uncorrelated, so that ∆ =
∏
h∈H Ph, for some sets Ph. Let H
′ = {(h, µ) |
h ∈ H, µ ∈ Ph}, define µ
′ by taking µ′((h, µ)) = µ, and set E = (H′,O,µ′). We show
that E refines G via g, where g((h, µ)) = h. Since ∆ =
∏
h∈H Ph, if µ ∈ ∆, then for every
µ(h) ∈ Ph, there is an h
′ ∈ g−1(h) (namely, h′ = (h,µ(h))) such that µ(h) = µ′(h′), by
definition of µ′. Conversely, if µ is such that for all h ∈ H, there exists some h′ ∈ g−1(h)
such that µ(h) = µ′(h′). Then h′ = (h, µ) for some µ ∈ Ph, and thus µ(h) ∈ Ph, and
µ ∈
∏
h∈H Ph = ∆. This proves that E refines G.
Proposition 3.5 Let G = (H,O,∆) be an uncorrelated generalized evidence space.
(a) The following inequalities hold when the denominators are nonzero:
(Pµ0,ob)
∗(h) ≤
wG(ob, h)µ0(h)
wG(ob, h)µ0(h) +
∑
h′ 6=h
wG(ob, h
′)µ0(h′)
;
(Pµ0,ob)∗(h) ≥
wG(ob, h)µ0(h)
wG(ob, h)µ0(h) +
∑
h′ 6=h
wG(ob, h′)µ0(h′)
.
If |H| = 2, these inequalities can be taken to be equalities.
(b) The following equalities hold:
wG(ob, h) =
(Ph)
∗(ob)
(Ph)∗(ob) +
∑
h′ 6=h
(Ph′)∗(ob)
;
wG(ob, h) =
(Ph)∗(ob)
(Ph)∗(ob) +
∑
h′ 6=h
(Ph′)∗(ob)
,
where Ph = {µ(h) | µ ∈ ∆}, for all h ∈ H.
Proof. For part (a), we just prove the first inequality; the second follows by a symmetric
argument. Assume that wG(ob, h)µ0(h) +
∑
h′ 6=hwG(ob, h
′)µ0(h
′) > 0. It is clearly suf-
ficient to show that for all w ∈ wG , (µ0 ⊕ w(ob, ·))(h) ≤ (wG(ob, h)µ0)/(wG(ob, h)µ0 +∑
h′ 6=hwG(ob, h
′)). The desired inequality then follows by properties of sup.
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Given w ∈ wG , by definition of wG and wG , w(ob, h) ≤ wG(ob, h) and wG(ob, h) ≤
w(ob, h), for all h ∈ H and ob ∈ O. Thus,∑
h′ 6=h
µ0(h)µ0(h
′)w(ob, h)wG(ob, h
′) ≤
∑
h′ 6=h
µ0(h)µ0(h
′)wG(ob, h)w(ob , h
′),
so
µ0(h)µ0(h)w(ob , h)wG(ob, h) +
∑
h′ 6=h
µ0(h)µ0(h
′)w(ob, h)wG(ob, h
′) ≤
µ0(h)µ0(h)w(ob , h)wG(ob, h) +
∑
h′ 6=h
µ0(h)µ0(h
′)wG(ob, h)w(ob , h
′).
It easily follows that
(µ0 ⊕ w(ob, ·))(h) =
µ0(h)w(ob , h)
µ0(h)w(ob , h) +
∑
h′ 6=h µ0(h
′)w(ob, h′)
≤
µ0(h)wG(ob, h)
µ0(h)wG(ob, h) +
∑
h′ 6=h µ0(h
′)wG(ob, h
′)
,
as required.
If |H| = 2, we show that the inequality can be strengthened into an equality. Assume
H = {h1, h2}. Without loss of generality, it suffices to show that
(Pµ0,ob)
∗(h1) ≥
µ0(h1)wG(ob, h1)
µ0(h1)wG(ob, h1) + µ0(h2)wG(ob, h2)
. (8)
The key step in the argument is establishing that for w ∈ wG , if wG(ob, h1) = w(ob, h1)
then wG(ob, h2) = w(ob, h2). We know that for every fixed ob and every w, w(ob, h1) =
1− w(ob, h2). If w(ob, h1) = wG(ob, h1) and w(ob, h2) > wG(ob, h2), then there must exist
w′ ∈ wG with w(ob, h2) > w
′(ob, h2); but then we must have w(ob, h1) = 1 − w(ob, h2) <
1 − w′(ob, h2) = w
′(ob, h1), contradicting the fact that w(ob, h1) = wG(ob, h1). Thus,
w(ob, h2) ≤ wG(ob, h2), so that w(ob, h2) = wG(ob, h2). To prove (8), we now proceed as
follows. Let w ∈ wG be such that w(ob, h1) = wG(ob, h1). (We know such a w exists since
wG is finite.) We now get that
(Pµ0,ob)
∗(h1) ≥ (µ0 ⊕ w(ob, ·))(h1)
=
µ0(h1)w(ob, h1)
µ0(h1)w(ob, h1) + µ0(h2)w(ob, h2)
=
µ0(h1)wG(ob, h1)
µ0(h1)wG(ob, h1) + µ0(h2)wG(ob, h2)
,
as required.
For part (b), we again prove only the first equality; the second again follows by a
symmetric argument. We first show that (Ph)
∗(ob) +
∑
h′ 6=h(Ph)∗(ob) > 0, to establish
that the right-hand side is well defined. By way of contradiction, assume that (Ph)
∗(ob) +∑
h′ 6=h(Ph)∗(ob) = 0. Since (Ph)
∗(ob) = 0, we have µh(ob) = 0 for all µh ∈ Ph; similarly,
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for every h′ 6= h, since (Ph′)∗(ob) = 0 and P
′
h is finite, there exists µh′ ∈ Ph′ such that
µh′(ob) = 0. Because ∆ is uncorrelated, we can find a µ ∈ ∆ such that µ(h
′)(ob) = 0
for every h′ ∈ H, contradicting the assumption we made that ∆ contains only likelihood
mappings that make every observation possible.
Since G = (H,O,∆) is uncorrelated, ∆ =
∏
h∈H Ph for some sets Ph. Thus, there exists
a µ ∈ ∆ such that µ(h)(ob) is (Ph)
∗(ob) and µ(h′)(ob) is (Ph′)∗(ob) when h
′ 6= h. (The
bounds are attained because each Ph is finite.) Since E = (H,O,µ) ∈ S(G), we have
wE(ob, h) =
µ(h)(ob)∑
h′∈Hµ(h
′)(ob)
=
(Ph)
∗(ob)
(Ph)∗(ob) +
∑
h′ 6=h(Ph)∗(ob)
and thus
wG(ob, h) ≥
(Ph)
∗(ob)
(Ph)∗(ob) +
∑
h′ 6=h(Ph)∗(ob)
. (9)
To prove equality, it suffices to show that (Ph)
∗(ob)/((Ph)
∗(ob) +
∑
h′ 6=h(Ph)∗(ob)) >
w(ob, h) for all w ∈ wG . So choose w ∈ wG and let the corresponding evidence space be
E = (H,O,µ) in S(G). Given h ∈ H and ob ∈ O, there are two cases. If µ(h)(ob) = 0, then
w(ob, h) = 0 ≤
(Ph)
∗(ob)
(Ph)∗(ob) +
∑
h′ 6=h(Ph)∗(ob)
.
If µ(h)(ob) > 0, then (Ph)
∗(ob) > µ(h)(ob) > 0, so
w(ob, h) =
µ(h)(ob)∑
h′∈Hµ(h
′)(ob)
=
1
1 +
∑
h′ 6=hµ(h
′)(ob)
µ(h)(ob)
≤
1
1 +
∑
h′ 6=h(Ph′ )∗(ob)
(Ph)∗(ob)
=
(Ph)
∗(ob)
(Ph)∗(ob) +
∑
h′ 6=h(Ph)∗(ob)
.
Since w was arbitrary, by the properties of sup,
wG(ob, h) ≤
(Ph)
∗(ob)
(Ph)∗(ob) +
∑
h′ 6=h(Ph)∗(ob)
. (10)
Equations (9) and (10) together give the result.
References
Epstein, L. and M. Schneider (2005). Learning under ambiguity. Unpublished manuscript,
available from http://www.econ.rochester.edu/Faculty/Epstein.html.
20
Good, I. J. (1950). Probability and the Weighing of Evidence. Charles Griffin & Co. Ltd.
Halpern, J. Y. (2003). Reasoning About Uncertainty. MIT Press.
Halpern, J. Y. and R. Fagin (1992). Two views of belief: belief as generalized probability
and belief as evidence. Artificial Intelligence 54, 275–317.
Halpern, J. Y. and R. Pucella (2005). Probabilistic algorithmic knowledge. Logical Meth-
ods in Computer Science 1 (3:1).
Halpern, J. Y. and R. Pucella (2006). A logic for reasoning about evidence. Journal of
Artificial Intelligence Research 26, 1–34.
Kyburg, Jr., H. E. (1983). Recent work in inductive logic. In T. Machan and K. Lucey
(Eds.), Recent Work in Philosophy, pp. 87–150. Rowman & Allanheld.
Shafer, G. (1976). A Mathematical Theory of Evidence. Princeton University Press.
Shafer, G. (1982). Belief functions and parametric models (with commentary). Journal
of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B 44, 322–352.
21
